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Knowledge and learning are important in combating financial crime generally
and white-collar crime in particular. The purpose of this research is to gen-
erate insights into prevention approaches in practice that may reflect on a
contingent approach. The five hundred largest business companies in terms
of annual turnover were identified in Norway for our empirical study of white-
collar crime. A paper letter was mailed to the chief financial officer (CFO)
asking him or her to fill in the questionnaire to be found on a web site using
a password found in the letter. The open-ended question in the questionnaire
to CFOs about prevention of white-collar crime was formulated as follows:
How can white-collar crime best be prevented in your company? Survey results
indicate an even distribution of respondents emphasizing control and respon-
dents emphasizing influence. This empirical research steps back from many
best practice articles and provides insights into preferences of chief financial
officers on how to prevent white-collar crime in the company.
Keywords: white-collar crime, CFO, auditing, internal control system,
knowledge, learning
Introduction
An important consequence of the dark side of leadership is the potential
of white-collar crime by executives (Fleet and Fleet, 2006; Furnham, 2007;
Ouimet, 2010). White-collar crime is not as visible as conventional crime
and detection is difficult. For instance, in a homicide case, there is gener-
ally a body and forensic evidence. In the case of financial crime, Hansen
(2009) argues that accounting and computer forensics are currently the in-
vestigator’s best tools in detection and implemented in most white-collar
investigations in recent years. Applications of science and technology to
white-collar crime cases is increasing, and advances in technology have led
to a greater dependence on expert testimony in white-collar crime cases,
keeping in mind that expert opinion cannot be given with absolute certainty.
Perhaps, Hansen (2009) argues, due to the financial resources to defend
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their cases available to elite individuals and corporations who are brought to
justice, plus aversion to negative publicity, plea bargaining prior to charges
is more intense as compared to that in conventional crime cases. Formal
charging is more likely to be viewed as a failure by prosecutors, because
of the larger number of resources that prosecutors have to be diverted to
prosecute white-collar crime cases. Also due to the greater stigma attached
to jail or prison time for elites, they may be reluctant to negotiate a plea
bargain if incarceration is included in the deal. On the other hand, it is
not unusual for convicted defendants to suddenly decide to cooperate in
investigations in order to receive leniency at sentencing.
Regulation played a major role in the waves of white-collar crime that
have struck many developed economies. During the 1980s, deregulation
in many countries led to creative financial schemes, some legitimate, but
others clearly criminal. Insider trading was rarely investigated or prosecuted
by regulatory agencies, even though it was and is illegal. Deregulation is
viewed as a culprit in allowing bad accounting practices, including the prac-
tice of hiding losses or debts, as in the case of Enron, as well as overstating
profits and assets. By regulation in response to major corporate crimes, it
is like closing the barn door after the sheep have all escaped. It is a difficult
task to rein in malfeasance, particularly if the monetary reward continues
to outweigh sanctions (Hansen, 2009).
Self-regulation as a strategy for private industries is dependent on the ac-
tions each business is willing and able to take to prevent white-collar crime.
Therefore, this paper addresses the following research question: How will
the chief financial officer (CFO) prevent white-collar crime in his or her busi-
ness organization? Results from a survey of CFOs in Norway are applied to
answer this research question.
Managerial auditing is important in combating financial crime generally
and white-collar crime in particular. The purpose of this research is to gen-
erate insights into prevention approaches in practice that may reflect on a
contingent approach to managerial auditing.
Self-Regulation
According to Hansen (2009), self-regulation does not appear to be a so-
lution either. Much of evaluation, either by external groups or internally, is
ceremonial. For example, managers at a technology company may have only
a rudimentary knowledge of chemistry, biology or computers, but employ
technological experts to do the core work of the company. In other exam-
ples, there is a conflict of interest, as in the case of Arthur Andersen who
served as both auditor and paid consultant to Enron. In addition, certifiable
standards have not proven to be successful. One reason is the frequent
disconnect between certification and consistent compliance.
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Self-regulation in terms of private policing of economic crime does not
appear to be a solution to Williams (2005) either. He identified five barriers
to this kind of governability:
1. Secrecy, low visibility and discretionary justice lead to informal negoti-
ations, easy termination, loose coupling between investigations and
formal legal frameworks, and potential privileges for some individuals
but not others.
2. Multiple legal standards and forum shopping lead to legal and proce-
dural standards that tend to vary on a case-by-case basis depending
on the specific legal avenue or forum that is selected.
3. Multiple legal actors with distinct credentials and qualifications apply
a variety of different professional and quasi-professional codes, stan-
dards and obligations.
4. Multiple stakeholders and interest groups tend to have conflicts of
interest. However, to speak of accountability and governance, one is
inevitably required to adopt a particular point of view.
5. Public-private dichotomy leads to a liberal legal tradition, where the
distinction between public and private remains an enduring feature of
legal thought. It hinges on two related principles that bear directly on
the activities of internal investigators. The first is that corporations
enjoy the same legal rights as individuals and are thus defined as
private legal actors. The second is that there are fundamental limits to
the authority and jurisdiction of the state that preclude unnecessary
interventions and incursions into the private realm.
Similar to both Hansen (2009) and Williams (2005), Schneider (2006)
studied privatizing economic crime enforcement by exploring the role of pri-
vate sector investigative agencies. A financial investigative agency refers
to an accounting-based, private sector organization that provides investiga-
tive, risk management, consulting and litigation support services address-
ing economic crime.
A special kind of self-regulation is self-protection, where protection is
potentially achieved by educating actors. An example is investor protection
by weaknesses of initial public offerings (IPO). Solaiman (2009) argues that
it is generally understood that investment knowledge empowers investors
to protect themselves from the culpability of issuers, their professionals
and intermediaries who are called gatekeepers. Investors’ ability to make
prudent investment judgments for allocation of resources is regarded as an
important element in every market economy.
In addition to self-protection, Solaiman (2009) argues there is a need
for regulators in protecting investors. Investor protection by securities reg-
Volume 1, Issue 1, 2012
48 Petter Gottschalk and Hans Solli-Sœther
ulators can be divided into two: indirect and direct protection. The former
refers to empowering the investors to protect themselves, whilst the latter
concerns protection by regulator through making, administering and enforc-
ing.
Private policing of financial crime will have to build on organizational jus-
tice as perceived by organizational members. Scott, Colquitt, and Paddock
(2009) find that a quarter century of research on organizational justice has
revealed a great deal about how employees react to justice rule adherence
and violation on the part of their managers. Employees evaluate justice
along a number of dimensions: fairness of decision outcomes, fairness of
decision-making processes, adequacy of explanations, and perceived sen-
sitivity of interpersonal communication.
These dimensions are part of what Rodell and Colquitt (2009) call an-
ticipatory justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, informational jus-
tice, and interpersonal justice. The effects of anticipatory justice have been
explored in the context of organizational change. Change is a natural com-
ponent of employees’ working lives, and employees may experience a vari-
ety of changes during their organizational tenure, ranging from large-scale
changes such as organizational relocations or mergers, to new policies such
as fringe benefit bans.
As part of anticipatory justice, Zapata-Phelan et al. (2009) studied pro-
cedural justice and intrinsic motivation among employees. What stands out
most from the results of their study is the significant relationship between
procedural justice and intrinsic motivation. The relationship was supported
using a self-report measure as well as reference motivation to both specific
tasks and multifaceted tasks in terms of overall job duties. Such relation-
ships will tend to influence the role and performance of financial investiga-
tive agencies.
Schneider (2006) recommends that public policies and programs be de-
veloped that nurture an increased and more formal role for financial in-
vestigative agencies within the context of a partnership with government
agencies. In Norway, a public debate in the media indicated that the role
of financial investigative agencies should be reduced and more resources
should be made available to the police (Føler meg rettsløs, 2008).
Research Design
The five hundred largest business companies in terms of annual turnover
were identified in Norway for our empirical study of white-collar crime. A
paper letter was mailed to the chief financial officer (CFO) asking him or her
to fill in the questionnaire to be found on a web site using a password found
in the letter. 50 respondents first filled in the questionnaire, representing a
response rate of ten percent. After a reminder was mailed to the sample, 61
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more respondents filled in the questionnaire, representing a response rate
of 22%. In addition, there were 28 incomplete responses, thereby creating
a total of 28% response rate.
The survey research was carried out from January to March 2010. Av-
erage number of employees in the responding companies was 1,671 per-
sons. The largest responding company had 30,000 employees. All letters
were mailed to the CFO, and most of the respondents were CFOs, while
some were CEOs and financial controllers.
The average age of respondents was 46 years, and they had on average
4.8 years of college and university education after high school. Most of
the respondents were men, as there were only 19 women among the 111
complete responses.
The open-ended question in the questionnaire to the CFO about preven-
tion of white-collar crime was formulated as: How can white-collar crime best
be prevented in your company?
A total of 91 respondents provided answers to this open-ended question.
Responses were classified by applying content analysis (Riffe and Freitag,
1997). In the first round of text reading, potential topics were identified.
Two main topics were identified. The first group of responses is con-
cerned with the ability to control by means of efficient and effective control
routines, transparent guidelines, reactions and consequences for offences
and misconduct. This main topic is labeled the reactive strategy in preven-
tion of white-collar crime.
The other group of responses is concerned with the ability to influence
by means of values and ethics, recruitment and hiring processes, attitudes
of integrity and accountability, and visible and determined leadership. This
other main topic is labeled the proactive strategy in prevention of white-
crime.
Based on the discussion of self-regulation in prevention of white-collar
crime, we conceptualize self-regulation as consisting of both the reactive as
well as the proactive strategy. Thus, self-regulation consists of control and
influence.
Research Results
As mentioned, the open-ended question in the questionnaire to the CFO
about prevention of white-collar crime was formulated as: How can white-
collar crime best be prevented in your company? Examples of control state-
ments provided by respondents include:
•Good internal control.
•Banks have a relatively strong regulation regime, external + internal
auditor, finance authorities, compliance and risk controllers, control
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committee, auditing group and money laundering regulation.
•Good control routines and internal procedures.
•Access control and reliable approval procedures.
•Control routines with division of responsibilities.
•Efficient systems and routines, regular internal controls.
• Implement effective control systems.
Examples of influence statements provided by respondents include:
•Continuous work on culture – values – ethics, show zero tolerance in
relation to misconduct.
•Openness with contacts and financial information.
•Attitudes of honesty and accountability as a culture in the company
at all levels.
•An explicit and visible leadership that monitors the organization.
•Good hiring procedures.
•Focus on ethics, where management is a good example in all situa-
tions.
•Build common culture, behavior, set of values and company identity.
Among the initial responses of 47 completed questionnaires for this
question, the following distribution was identified:
•Control. 25 out of 47 respondents would focus on controlling and
auditing, thus 53% for control.
• Influence. 22 out of 47 respondents would focus on influencing and
behavior, thus 47% for influence.
This is an interesting result as there is almost an even distribution be-
tween the two main themes, where half of the respondents emphasize con-
trol, while the other half emphasizes influence.
After a reminder was mailed to non-respondents, a total of 47 completed
questionnaires were received, which is exactly the same number as in the
first round. The distribution among chief financial officers in terms of re-
sponses to the open-ended question was as follows:
•Control. 20 out of 47 respondents would focus on controlling and
auditing, thus 43% for control.
• Influence. 27 out of 47 respondents would focus on influencing and
behavior, thus 57% for influence.
We find an even distribution among control and influence, but the majority
in this second round emphasizes influence to prevent white-collar crime. In
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total, the following distribution for all 94 respondents that filled in this open-
ended question was as follows:
•Control. 45 out of 94 respondents would focus on controlling and
auditing, thus 48% for control.
• Influence. 49 out of 94 respondents would focus on influencing and
behavior, thus 52% for influence.
In terms of self-regulation, respondents who emphasize influence are
slightly more than respondents who emphasize control.
Discussion
White-collar crime contains several clear components (Pickett and Pickett,
2002):
• It is deceitful. People involved in white-collar crime tend to cheat, lie,
conceal, and manipulate the truth.
• It is intentional. Fraud does not result from simple error or neglect but
involves purposeful attempts to illegally gain an advantage. As such,
it induces a course of action that is predetermined in advance by the
perpetrator.
• It breaches trust. Business is based primarily on trust. Individual rela-
tionships and commitments are geared toward the respective respon-
sibilities of all parties involved. Mutual trust is the glue that binds
these relationships together, and it is this trust that is breached when
someone tries to defraud another person or business.
• It involves losses. Financial crime is based on attempting to secure an
illegal gain or advantage and for this to happen there must be a victim.
There must also be a degree of loss or disadvantage. These losses
may be written off or insured against or simply accepted. White-collar
crime nonetheless constitutes a drain on national resources.
• It may be concealed. One feature of financial crime is that it may re-
main hidden indefinitely. Reality and appearance may not necessarily
coincide. Therefore, every business transaction, contract, payment,
or agreement may be altered or suppressed to give the appearance
of regularity. Spreadsheets, statements, and sets of accounts cannot
always be accepted at face value; this is how some frauds continue
undetected for years.
• There may be an appearance of outward respectability. Fraud may be
perpetrated by persons who appear to be respectable and profes-
sional members of society, and may even be employed by the victim.
Self-regulation in the form of corporate governance cannot alone prevent
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white-collar crime. Governance in the form of clear policies and procedures,
formalized cross-company communication, along with performance-based
salary for board members and employees reduces incidences of white-collar
crime within corporations. An ethical issue is whether there should be a
material reward for not committing a crime. Such a reward policy might be
perceived as paying drug dealers for not selling drugs, if the same strategy
were to be applied to ordinary criminals. Also it insinuates that board mem-
bers and corporate executives are not well compensated already, which is
not the case in many industries that are plagued with white-collar crime,
including the financial sector (Hansen, 2009).
Policing financial crime – according to Pickett and Pickett (2002) – is
concerned with whistle blowing and detection, roles of shareholders and
main board and chief executive officer and senior executives, investiga-
tions, forensics. Policing financial crime – according to Levi (2007) – is
concerned with the organization of policing deception, the contexts of po-
lice undercover work, covert investigations of white-collar crime, prosecu-
tion and relationship to policing fraud. Covert activity is restricted mainly
to the informal obtaining of financial information or the official obtaining of
information about suspected bank accounts without the knowledge of the
account-holder.
Another limitation of self-regulation is ‘know-nothing’ CEOs. Hughes,
Louwers, and Reynolds (2008: 115) argue that much of the national media
in the US has paid attention to corporate scandals where ‘know-nothing’
CEOs and complacent/conflicted auditors missed the accounting frauds:
In each case, ‘revelations’ abound as to lax corporate control environ-
ments and defective or non-existent audit procedures that prevented identi-
fication of potential abuses.
Furthermore, internal auditors’ performance may largely depend on their
moral decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas. Woodbine and Liu
(2010) found that the moral choice of internal auditors can be explained by
the leadership style, personal needs strengths and demographic variables.
Conclusion
49 out of 94 responding CFOs in Norway would prevent white-collar crime
by influencing the organization in terms of culture, values, behavior, lead-
ership and ethics. 45 out of 94 responding CFOs emphasized control in
terms of internal and external control, guidelines and procedures, audits
and accounting. In the self-regulation circle, slightly more respondents em-
phasized influence rather than control. Future research might explore the
interactions between control and influence. Implications for a contingent
approach in managerial auditing need to be explored in future research.
Furthermore, future research might be expanded to make sure that
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the entire variety of white-collar crime is considered by respondents. This
could be done by structuring the questionnaire into additional sub-questions
linked to the original open-ended question.
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